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FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS IN THE EU AND OCCUPATIONAL 
PENSIONS: CONFLICTING PRIORITIES? BETWEEN CASE LAW AND 
LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTIONS 
 
MARION DEL SOL∗ AND MARCO ROCCA∗∗ 
 
Abstract 
The European Union appears to be promoting at the same time both cross-national mobility of 
workers and an increased role for occupational pensio . There is, however, a potential tension 
between these two objectives because workers risk losing (some of) their pension rights under an 
occupational scheme as a consequence of their mobility. After long negotiations, the EU has 
addressed this issue through a minimum standards Directive. Shortly before the adoption of this 
Directive, the Court of Justice also delivered an important decision in the same field, in the case 
of Casteels v British Airways. By analysing the resulting legal framework for safeguarding pension 
rights under occupational schemes in the context of w rkers’ mobility, we argue that the 
application of the case law developed by the Court f Justice in the field of free movement of 
workers has the potential to offer superior protection compared to the Directive. We also highlight 
the fact that the present legal framework seems to afford a much fuller protection to the intra-
company cross-national mobility of workers employed by multinational companies, while also 
seemingly favouring mobility for highly specialised workers. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This article explores the interaction between two areas of intervention of the European Union (EU) 
namely the free movement of workers and occupational pensions. The former is a well-known 
(and developed) area of EU law, forming one of the fundamental pillars upon which the European 
construction has been built. The latter area has been growing in importance particularly over the 
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last twenty years, although this has mainly been due to its ‘financial’ aspects.1 As we show in this 
Introduction, different policies of the EU are now explicitly aimed at increasing both mobility and 
the use of occupational pensions. We argue, however, that promoting both workers’ mobility and 
the use of occupational pensions necessarily engenders a tension that the EU has only recently 
started to address. 
 
The aim of this article is to explore this tension. By comparing the case law of the Court of Justice 
on free movement of workers with the (relatively) recent Directive 2014/50 on the minimum 
requirements for enhancing worker mobility between Member States by improving the acquisition 
and preservation of supplementary pension rights, we highlight the different protections offered 
by these two sets of instruments. In doing so we also consider the potential for a mutually 
reinforcing dialogue (or for a conflict) between the two. Furthermore, we assess the kind of 
‘mobility’ implicitly envisaged by the present state of EU law, which appears to provide incentives 
only to certain kind of international mobility.  
 
In this article, we refer to concepts, such as ‘waiting period’ 2 and ‘vesting period’3, which are 
relevant for the specific issue of the interaction between workers’ mobility and occupational 
pensions. Definitions of these concepts are provided by Directive 2014/50. The ‘portability’ of 
occupational pensions was, in its turn, defined by the 2005 proposal4 as ‘the option open to workers 
of acquiring and retaining pension rights when exercising their right to freedom of movement or 
occupational mobility’.5 Finally, we deviate slightly from the terminology of Directive 2014/50 by 
using the concept of ‘occupational pensions’ in lieu of ‘supplementary pensions’. The meaning, 
however, should be understood to be identical.  
                                                 
1  As opposed to the more ‘social’ one. See on this point the Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the activities and 
supervision of institutions for occupational retirem nt provision’ COM(2014) 167 final: ‘The EESC disagrees 
with the approach to IORPs purely as financial market institutions, which fails to acknowledge and respect 
their specific circumstances. IORPs are institutions which perform an important social function’. 
2  Directive 2014/50/EU of the European Parliament ad of the Council of 16 April 2014 on minimum 
requirements for enhancing worker mobility between Member States by improving the acquisition and 
preservation of supplementary pension rights, Article 3. 
3  Ibidem. 
4  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the portability of 
supplementary pension rights, COM/2005/0507 final. 
5  Ibidem, Article 3. 
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The article is structured as follows. In the rest of this Introduction we present the two potentially 
conflicting aims pursued by the EU, namely promoting workers’ mobility and occupational 
pensions. In Section 2 we provide a brief account of Directive 2014/50, which also covers the 
protracted negotiations which ultimately led to its adoption. Section 3 deals with the interaction 
between the case law of the Court of Justice on free movement of workers (including the situation 
of frontier workers) and occupational pensions. We also look to the role of multinational 
companies and pan-European pension schemes in underpinning workers’ mobility. In Section 4 
we draw some conclusions on the different pathways to marrying workers’ mobility and 
occupational pensions which emerge from the encounters between EU legislation and the case law 
of the Court of Justice. 
 
1.1 The EU and Occupational Pensions 
The competencies of the European Union in the field of social protection are, as is well known, 
quite limited.6 The EU cannot directly act in order to harmonise national retirement systems. That 
being said, demographic as well as economic considerat ons have brought to the fore the objective 
of promoting the convergence of these national system .7 This process of convergence, mainly 
carried out through the Open Method of Coordination, 8  sees occupational pensions as a 
fundamental piece of the puzzle. Thus, these 2nd pillar pensions have been made the object of 
specific attention from EU institutions, aimed at increasing their importance ‒ although their 
importance varies widely from one Member State to the other. This has been mainly achieved 
through competences devoted to the internal market, by, for instance, providing the framework for 
the management of these instruments in transnational situ tions (on the basis of the freedom to 
provide services)9 as well as by ensuring the protection of the rights of the affiliated.10 Hence, the 
                                                 
6  See Article 153 TFEU, as well as the case law of the Court of Justice reaffirming in multiple occasions the 
competence of Member State as regards the organisatio  of social security systems.  
7  Green Paper - Supplementary Pensions in the Single Market, COM (97) 283 final, 10 June 1997; Joint report 
by the Commission and the Council on adequate and sustainable pensions, March 2003; White Paper - An 
Agenda for Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions, COM (2012) 55 final, 12 December 2012. See Coron 
(2007). 
8  Cornilleau, Sterdyniak and Math (2007). 
9  For a political science analysis, see Coron (2003). 
10  See Muller (2008). 
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EU has, so far, mainly understood the phenomenon of occupational pensions through the 
institutions in charge of their management.11 
 
The diversity of occupational pensions regimes and their uneven presence across Member States, 
clearly represents a challenge for the intra-European mobility of workers. Indeed, the choice of 
moving from one Member State to another to take up work for the acquisition and preservation of 
pension rights in the context of an occupational pension regime is by no means neutral. The issue 
then turns into one of the free movement of workers.  
 
1.2 Free movement of workers 
Free movement of workers has been one of the fundamental pillars of the European integration 
since its very beginning. Although the provision guaranteeing this right has been dubbed the 
‘Cinderella provision’,12 with respect to the other fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaties, one cannot overlook its importance both in economic and social terms. Indeed, both the 
Spaak13 and Ohlin Reports14 referred to the importance of the free movement of labour for the 
establishment and effectiveness of the common market. Since then, a fundamental rights rationale 
joined the economic one even before the shift towards  ‘European citizenship’ approach.15 Such 
an evolution is perfectly embodied by the Opinion of AG Jacobs in the Bettray case.16 Referring 
to the Third Recital of the Preamble to Regulation 1612/68,17 the Advocate General affirmed that 
‘labour is not, in Community law, to be regarded as a commodity’, so that the fundamental rights 
of workers should take precedence ‘over satisfying the requirements of the economies of the 
Member States’.18 
                                                 
11  These can have very different legal structures. This has an impact on the application of different sets of rules. 
Hence, when the retirement scheme is organised by an insurance company, such a company will be covered 
by Directives on insurance. On the other hand, an institution for occupational retirement provision will be 
covered by Directive 2003/41 of 3 June 2003. 
12  Barnard (2012: 143). 
13  Report of the Heads of Delegations to the Foreign Mi isters at the Messina Conference, 21 April 1956. 
14  Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation. Report by a Group of Experts, Studies and Reports, New 
Series, No. 46 (Geneva, ILO, 1956) 
15  O’Leary (2011: 506). 
16  CJEU, 344/87, 31 May 1989, Bettray v Staatssecrataris van Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:1989:226. 
17  Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within 
the Community. 
18  Opinion of AG Jacobs in Bettray, paras 28-29. 
5 
 
That being said, the promotion of labour mobility b the European institutions focuses on an 
economic rationale. European employment guidelines proposed by the Commission and adopted 
by the Council have referred to the need to ensure mobility under the heading of ‘enhancing the 
functioning of labour markets’19 or ‘increasing labour market participation and reducing structural 
unemployment’.20 Workers’ mobility between Member States remains, however, relatively low, 
with around 10 million European citizens of working a e (or the 3 per cent of the total workforce) 
having moved to another Member State.21 This number is in fact surpassed by third-country 
nationals who have moved to the EU.22 
 
The lack of sufficient labour mobility has been identified as one of the weaknesses of the Eurozone, 
depriving the countries that have adopted the Euro of yet another tool to respond to asymmetric 
(economic) shocks.23 Seen from this perspective, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Directive on 
supplementary pension rights24 was finally adopted during a period of economic crisis and 
widespread (and asymmetric) unemployment.25 In another rather cliché development, case law 
preceded the adoption of a legislative instrument.26 On this occasion, the Opinion of A.G. Kokott 
warned against the obstacle to workers’ mobility created by the unfavourable treatment of 
occupational pension rights.27 We will come back to this decision in Section 3. 
 
2 THE PORTABILITY DIRECTIVE THAT WASN’T 
The first proposal for a portability directive in the field of occupational pensions was tabled by the 
Commission in 2005.28 This was to mark the beginning of an ‘extremely long and convoluted 
                                                 
19  European Council, Guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States, COM(2010) 193 final, p 21. 
20  European Council, Guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States, COM(2015) 98 final 3. 
21  European Commission, EU Employment and Social Situation Quarterly Review, Recent Trends in the 
Geographical Mobility of Workers in the EU, Luxembourg, 2014, p. 4.  
22  Canetta, Fries-Tersch  and Mabilia (2014: 6). 
23  See for instance Krugman  (2012) referring to the seminal paper by Mundell (1961). 
24  Directive 2014/50/EU of the European Parliament ad of the Council of 16 April 2014 on minimum 
requirements for enhancing worker mobility between Member States by improving the acquisition and 
preservation of supplementary pension rights, hereinafter ‘Supplementary Pension Rights Directive’ or 
‘Directive 2014/50’. 
25  A correlation highlighted by Guardiancich (2015a). 
26  Court of Justice, 11 November 2010, C-379/09, Casteels v British Airways plc, ECLI:EU:C:2011:131. 
27  Opinion in Casteels, para. 45. 
28  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the portability of 
supplementary pension rights, COM/2005/0507 final, hereinafter ‘2005 Proposal’.  
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process’29 which ultimately led to the adoption of the Directive on supplementary pension rights 
after almost ten years of negotiation.30 Though the reasons for this difficulty are multifaceted, the 
main obstacle was undoubtedly the important differences between national systems of 
occupational pensions.31 
 
In order to briefly sketch ‘the story before the story’, it is worth remembering that occupational 
pensions have long been excluded by the European regime for the coordination of social security.32 
In fact, after a tentative extension of this regime to (mandatory) occupational schemes operated by 
the Court of Justice,33 the European legislator chose to explicitly limit the coordination to schemes 
finding their source in a statutory instrument.34 Instead, Directive 98/4935 provided minimal 
safeguards for the supplementary pension rights of mobile workers. However, the protection for 
mobile workers was limited to the preservation of acquired rights and to the guarantee of receiving 
payment in their new state of residence.36 The only category of workers singled out for cross-
border membership of an occupational pension scheme was that of posted workers.37  
 
The proposal introduced by the Commission in 2005 aimed at addressing the shortcomings of this 
situation. Concerning acquisition, the proposal provided that the minimum age (for joining a 
scheme and/or for acquiring pension rights) should not be higher than 21, with a maximum waiting 
period of one year and a maximum vesting period of tw  years.38 The proposal was particularly 
ambitious on transferability, by providing for the possibility for the worker to transfer their 
acquired rights to another scheme.39 Providers were also obliged to reimburse the contributions of 
                                                 
29  Guardiancich (2015b: 87). 
30  Three contributions, written at the three different stages of these negotiations provide a comprehensive picture 
of the process: Kalogeropoulou (2006). Oliver (2009) and Guardiancich, note 29 above. 
31  Guardiancich, note 29 above: 75 and ff.; Haverland (2007). 
32  Put in place by Regulation 1408/71, then replaced by Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009. 
33  Court of Justice, 30 June 1966, Case 61/65, Vaassen-Göbbels v Management of the Beambtenfondsvoor het 
Mijnbedrijf, ECLI:EU:C:1966:39. See Baugniet (2014: 91). 
34  This was later confirmed by the Court of Justice in the case C-35/97, 24 September 1998, Commission v France, 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:431. 
35  Council Directive 98/49/EC of 29 June 1998 on safeguarding the supplementary pension rights of employed 
and self-employed persons moving within the Community. 
36  See Kalogeropoulou, note 30 above: 96. 
37  Directive 98/49, Article 6. 
38  2005 Proposal, Article 4. 
39  Ibidem, Article 6. Member State had however the possibility to exempt unfunded schemes (Recital 10). 
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workers not qualifying for pension rights (i.e. those who did not fulfil the conditions of age, waiting 
or vesting periods) at the moment of their exit from the scheme.40 
 
The 2007 proposal41 marks the shift from portability to minimum requirements. Hence, the issues 
related to transferability were not addressed. The possibility of reimbursement was also 
narrowed.42 On acquisition, the amended proposal maintained th maximum waiting period of one 
year and the minimum age of 21. Vesting periods based on the worker’s age were differentiated: 
a maximum of one year for those over 25 years, and a maximum five years for the others. Finally, 
dormant rights received specific attention. These should be treated ‘fairly’, with the proposed 
Directive providing a series of examples of fair treatment.43 
 
2.1 The compromise 
The text ultimately adopted following the new proposal of 2013 continued along the path of 
diminishing ambitions. On the issue of acquisition, the Directive is relatively similar to its previous 
version, confirming the minimum age of 21 plus a combined total duration of waiting and vesting 
periods of three years.44 Concerning preservation of acquired rights and reimbursement rules, the 
Directive did not change much of the previous 2007 version.45 Importantly, the Directive is not 
retroactive, thus applying only to contributions and pension rights acquired after its 
implementation. 
 
At the end of the day, what started as a ‘portability Directive’ ended up as a Directive on minimum 
requirements. The thorny issue of transferring an actuarially fair value of pension rights from one 
Member State to the other was left undecided, as was the possibility of cross-border membership 
and the effect of the still existing ‘waiting plus vesting’ periods for highly mobile workers. The 
initial proposal met with strong opposition precisely because of the uneven impact that the 
provisions on portability would have had on different schemes. In particular, by excluding the 
                                                 
40  Ibidem, Article 4. 
41  Amended proposal for a Directive of the European P rliament and of the Council on minimum requirements 
for enhancing worker mobility by improving the acquisition and preservation of supplementary pension rights, 
COM/2007/0603 final, hereinafter ‘2007 Proposal’. 
42  2007 Proposal, Article 4(d). 
43  Ibidem, Article 5(1). 
44  Directive 2014/50, Article 4(1)(a). 
45  Ibidem, Articles 4(1)(c) and 5. 
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transfer for unfunded schemes, the proposals would have entailed the risk of a unidirectional flow 
of capital away from the countries characterised by funded schemes.46 The question of the cost of 
portability also played a role in the opposition to the proposal.47 
 
Beyond the actual content summarised above, a further element differentiates the proposals. This 
is the choice of the legal basis operated by the Commission, an element which is potentially 
relevant in the context of the present article. So, with the final (2013) proposal, the legal basis was 
changed from Article 48 TFEU, dealing with the coordination of social security, to Article 46 
which, in conjunction with Article 45, covers the broader scope of free movement of workers.  
 
As highlighted by O’Leary48 (writing about the coordination of social security) there is a potential 
tension between rights and principles stemming from the Treaties and the detailed secondary 
legislation adopted to implement these same rights. This issue is explored in Section 3.  
 
2.2 A limited right to information 
A more specific (but fundamental) topic in the field of occupational pensions is that of information 
for affiliated workers.49  Once again, different regimes across Europe are chara terised by 
considerable diversity in terms of the forms that this information might take.50 As such, it is not 
surprising that Directive 2014/50 only devotes one Article to the information for both active and 
dormant members.51  Reflecting Recital 25 of the Directive, the closing paragraph of Article 6 
states that: ‘The obligations under this Article shall be without prejudice to and shall be in addition 
to the obligations of the institutions for occupational retirement provision under Article 11 of 
                                                 
46  Pension providers from The Netherlands were particularly concerned by this risk, so much so that the Dutch 
government actually threatened to veto the proposal. See Mabbett (2009: 787).  
47  See for instance the press statement by the European Federation for Retirement Provision of 20 October 2005, 
available at: https://www.eerstekamer.nl/eu/documenteu/persbericht_efrp_en/f=/vh6fn2qw94uz.pdf . 
48  O’Leary, note 15 above: 545. 
49  Or their representatives. 
50  One should not forget that, beyond the differences between Member States, a number of different methods for 
the provision of information can co-exist in the same Member State. 
51  The Article also deals with the provision of information in the case of survivor’s benefits, which we ill not 
cover. 
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Directive 2003/41/EC’.52 Thus, an intertextual reading of the instruments is necessary in order to 
obtain the whole picture of information rights. 
 
As regards the content, Directive 2003/41 (Article 11) covers different types of information. On 
the one hand, it deals with general aspects, such as annual accounts and annual reports, and 
investment policy principles of the scheme. On the other, more specific aspects are also covered, 
such as exits and options for payment. Finally, the same Article provides for the rights to 
information of members53 that are the focus of our attention in this context. An Institution for 
Occupational Retirement Provision (IORP) must hence i form the member of the level of acquired 
rights in case of cessation of employment. They must al o provide information about the 
possibilities for transfer of acquired rights to another institution. 
 
In the framework of Directive 2014/50, obligations concerning information focus on the 
consequences of mobility, both for active54 and dormant members (Article 6). For the former, the 
aim of the Directive is to provide them with information concerning the impact of cessation of 
employment on their pension rights under the occupation l scheme. This covers acquired rights, 
conditions for acquisition, treatment of dormant rights and methods for the assessment of vested 
rights.55 In the likely scenario of the absence of a possibility for portability, an active member will 
probably become a dormant one after his or her mobility. He or she will then be entitled to 
information about dormant rights, covering their value or assessment as well as their future 
treatment. 
 
Obligations stemming from Directive 2014/50 will then complement those established by 
Directive 2003/41. In the context of mobility, this entails a substantial increase in the information 
                                                 
52  Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 June 2003 on the activities and 
supervision of institutions for occupational retirem nt provision (so-called ‘IORP Directive’). 
53  In the case of a defined benefits (DB) scheme, th information about the projected level which should be 
attained by the benefits. In the case of defined contributions (DC) schemes information covers eventual options 
of allocation (together with a description of risks and costs associated with every option). 
54‘ Workers whose current employment relationship entitl s them or is likely to entitle them, after fulfilling any 
acquisition conditions, to a supplementary pension in accordance with the provisions of a supplementary 
pension scheme’, Article 3(c) of Directive 2014/50. 
55  The Article also provides that ‘[w]here the scheme allows early access to vested pension rights through the 
payment of a capital sum, the information provided shall also include a written statement that the member 
should consider taking advice on investing that capital sum for retirement provision’. 
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content. That said, the actual impact on the workers’ protection should be assessed in light of the 
methods for delivering this information. In this sen , Article 6 proposes a narrow conception of 
information.56 Multiple elements highlight the limits and the lack of ambition of the Directive on 
this point. 
 
On the one hand, it is regrettable that, in formulating Article 6, the European legislator opted for 
the communication of information ‘upon request’.57 This characteristic is particularly problematic 
in the context of the communication of the value of d rmant rights (or the assessment thereof). In 
practice, there is no obstacle hindering the automaic provision of yearly information to dormant 
members. Similarly, automatic information could also have been established for active members. 
In the case of externalised regimes, employers could have been given an obligation to signal the 
cessation of the employment relationship to the managing institution, in order to trigger the 
transmission of the necessary information (on the eff cts of the cessation and the treatment of 
dormant rights) to the member. The necessity of a specific request by the worker could have been 
limited to those instances where the worker requires this information before the actual cessation 
of employment takes place. 
 
On the other hand, paragraph 3 of Article 6 only requires that ‘[i]nformation shall be provided 
clearly, in writing, and within a reasonable period f time’. In terms of the ‘quality’ of the 
information, the degree of detail seems more limited than that provided by Directive 2003/41, 
which mandates the provision of ‘detailed and substantial information’.58 Thus, this weaker 
provision does not seem to guarantee information sufficient for the member to have a clear and 
complete picture of his or her situation with respect to the pension regime. By referring to Article 
38 of the proposal for a so-called IORP II Directive,59  the legislator might have required 
information to be provided ‘written in a clear manner, using clear, succinct and comprehensible 
language, avoiding the use of jargon and avoiding technical terms where everyday words can be 
                                                 
56  It is also worth highlighting the absence of precision concerning the subject of the obligation of providing the 
information. Member States are themselves called to nsure that the information can actually be obtained. Each 
transposition will then have to adapt to the specific national situation in identifying the entity concerned.  
57  This choice mirrors the one adopted in the IORP Directive, Article 11(4). 
58  Directive 2003/41, Article 11(4). 
59  Which provides the principles concerning provision f information. See proposal for a Directive on the 
activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision (recast), COM(2014) 167 final 
– 2014/0091 (COD). 
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used instead’.60 The extent of ‘reasonable’ delay for the provision f information is also left 
undecided, allowing Member States to set a ceiling (o ce a year) for the provision of information. 
 
Thus, while the actual content of the information is adapted to the needs of the mobile worker, the 
method for delivering this information remains far rom satisfactory.61 The necessity of a specific 
request clearly clashes with the complexity of pension regimes and with the potential impact of 
the mobility itself (hence, the cessation of employment) on pension rights. In light of this, it is only 
on request that the given worker will obtain the necessary information to assess such an impact. 
Directive 2014/50 seems, therefore, to depict the profile of a worker who is already aware of the 
importance of considering the impact of mobility onhis or her pension rights. Highly mobile 
workers engaged in international careers are probably those who stand to profit from this Directive, 
insofar as they are already used to assessing the pros and cons of every mobility decision. 
Moreover, these same workers should prima facie be able to profit from the information covered 
by the requirements set by the Directive, by exercising individual choices to compensate eventual 
shortfalls caused by the treatment, for instance, of dormant rights. All in all, the information 
requirements set by Directive 2014/50 seem to point t  a rather ‘golden’ (or ‘high-skilled’) kind 
of mobility. 
 
3 WORKERS’ MOBILITY, OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AND THE CO URT 
 
In looking at the legal basis of Directive 2014/50, we argue that the Court of Justice is not bound 
to consider the free movement of workers as sufficiently guaranteed by the provisions of the 
Directive. The CJEU has sometimes provided an interpretation of secondary legislation heavily 
inspired by the legal basis of such legislation.62 Moreover, secondary legislation is always subject 
to a ‘constitutionally oriented’ interpretation in l ght of primary law, which can sometimes border 
                                                 
60  The recast proposal is in fact extremely precise. It specifies that information shall be ‘presented in a way that 
is easy to read, using characters of readable size’. 
61  Member Statas are, however, free to adopt or maintain more favourable provisions dealing with the right to 
information. The Directive also feature a non-regression clause which states that the transposition the Directive 
shall not be used as a reason for reducing existing rights (including rights to information). 
62  For example, in the context of the Posting of Workers Directive (Directive 96/71) with the controversial 
decisions C-341/05, 18 December 2007, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:809. and C-346/06, 3 April 2008, Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen, ECLI:EU:C:2008:189. 
See Davies (2008). 
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on the contra legem.63 This is even more relevant in the context of the fre  movement of workers 
since it has been repeatedly found to have direct effect both in vertical and horizontal situations.64 
 
The Court of Justice has developed its case law on the basis of situations where workers’ mobility 
had an impact, whether direct or indirect, on his or her occupational pension. Some of these 
decisions arose in connection with the situation of a frontier worker, which is particularly relevant 
both in terms of the number of workers potentially concerned and for its connection with fiscal 
issues. 
 
3.1 Frontier workers 
Frontier workers65 represent a specific case of intra-European mobility. Their situation has 
important implications both in terms of social security and fiscal considerations. Frontier workers 
are, in fact, subject to the fiscal regime of the Mmber State in which they reside. This can have 
an impact on retirement schemes that take into account the fiscal situation of the workers, 
amounting to an indirect discrimination. The Court of Justice has been confronted with these kinds 
of situations, which have been decided on the basis of rules dealing with workers’ mobility in the 
EU.66 
 
In Commission v Germany (2009)67 the Court had to consider the German Riester legislation. More 
specifically, it had to decide on the incentives to instruments for private pensions, as well as for 
the acquisition of a house. These incentives were, however, limited to persons who were 
completely covered by the German fiscal system. Such a ondition had the effect of excluding 
frontier workers working in Germany but residing in a neighbouring Member State. The CJEU 
                                                 
63  See the interpretation of the Directive on Transfer of Undertakings (Directive 2001/23/EC) in light of the 
freedom to conduct a business protected by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 16), in case C-
426/11, 18 July 2013, Alemo Herron, ECLI:EU:C:2013:521. A similar approach has also been proposed by 
A.G. Wahl in case C-201/15, AGET Iraklis (though the Court ultimately did not follow it), concerning the 
Collective Redundancies Directive (Directive 98/59). 
64  See Case 41-74, 4 December 1974, Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office, ECLI:EU:C:1974:133, and C-281/98, 6 
June 2000, Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, ECLI:EU:C:2000:296. On this point see, 
in general, Barnard, note 12 above: 157. 
65  Workers who pursue their occupation in the territo y of a Member State, while residing in the territo y of 
another Member State.  
66  Notably Article 45 TFUE and Regulation 1612/68, replaced by Regulation 492/2011. 
67  Court of Justice, Case C‑269/07, 10 September 2009, Commission of the European Communities v Federal 
Republic of Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2009:527.  
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found these measures to be in breach of the free move ent of workers enshrined in the EU 
Treaties, as ‘mobile’ workers were treated less favourably on the basis of their mobility.68 This 
followed the approach proposed by the Commission in the infringement procedure.69 Moreover, 
the Court condemned the German law as it denied ‘cross-border workers the right to use the 
subsidised capital for the acquisition or construction of an owner-occupied dwelling unless it was 
situated in Germany’,70 in light of the fact that frontier workers would be more frequently 
interested in acquiring such a property in the Membr State of their residence. 
 
This decision provides a few interesting points foranalysis. First, fiscal incentives for 
complementary retirement regimes cannot ignore the si uation of the specific worker, in particular 
the effects stemming from the worker’s mobility. Fiscal incentives must therefore be considered 
together with the eventual awarding of social advantages.71 Second, as we saw before, the action 
of the EU Commission can have an important impact on occupational pensions through indirect 
avenues. Thus, the mobility of frontier workers warrants the scrutiny of the Commission because 
of its transnational aspect, a scrutiny which then expands to fiscal measures.  
 
In fact, the situation of frontier workers is also pecific in that they might well spend their entire 
career in a situation of ‘mobility’ without further changing Member States. As such, conditions for 
the acquisition of pension rights in the country in which they carry out their work is of paramount 
importance for their future retirement. At the same time, frontier workers are most likely to receive 
their pension in a transnational situation, which again brings under the spotlight the conditions for 
the (transnational) payment of retirement benefits.  
 
A second important decision must be mentioned in this context, notably the Erny decision of 
2012.72 The case was brought by Mr. Erny, a French citizen residing in France and working in 
Germany, against his employer, the Daimler group. It dealt with the method for calculating a salary 
integration in the framework of a scheme of part-time work prior to retirement set up by a company 
                                                 
68  Commission v Germany (2009), para. 116. 
69  Ibidem, para. 70. 
70  Ibidem, para. 85. 
71  Coursier (2009), Lhernould (2006: 551). 
72  Court of Justice, C-172/11, 28 June 2012, Georges Erny v Daimler AG – Werk Wörth, ECLI:EU:C:2012:399. 
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agreement. In particular, the calculation took intoaccount the German income tax rate, which was 
lower than the French one, resulting in a lower amount (after tax) for the French resident.73 
 
The decision is interesting as it brings retirement schemes established by collective agreement 
inside the scope of Article 45 TFUE,74 while also applying the principle of equal treatment for 
mobile workers after taxes. Social actors are therefore required, in the same vein as public 
authorities, to respect of the non-discrimination principle, so that comparable situations are not 
treated differently and different situations are not treated in the same way (as in the case of Mr. 
Erny). Dispositions of a collective agreement breaching such a principle, ‘[i]n accordance with 
Article 7(4) of Regulation No 1612/68’, are null and void.75 Hence, collective agreements (whether 
at company or sectoral level) establishing occupation l retirement plans must take into account the 
situation of mobile workers in general, and frontier workers in particular, in order to avoid treating 
them in a less favourable way. 
 
A combined reading of these decisions is necessary. The conclusion is that the Court of Justice 
clearly approaches workers’ mobility in the field of ccupational pensions by applying the 
principles of non-discrimination and of equal treatment of mobile workers, considering their social 
and fiscal aspects. However, one should keep in mind that both decisions dealt with frontier 
workers, whose situation remains specific, especially from the point of view of fiscal rules. 
 
3.2 Free movement of workers and the Casteels case 
Turning to the broader topic of workers’ mobility, he decision delivered by the Court of Justice 
in the Casteels case represents the necessary starting point for our analysis.76 
 
Mr. Casteels worked for British Airways since 1974, moving between different countries during 
his career (notably Belgium, France, Germany, and Belgium once again). At the point of 
retirement, British Airways refused77 to take into account, for the purposes of awarding Mr. 
                                                 
73  Erny, para. 14. 
74  On the basis of the well-known Bosman line of cases. See Court of Justice, C-415/93, 15 December 1995, 
Union royale belge des sociétés de football associati n ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463. 
75  Ibidem, para. 52. 
76  For a more detailed analysis, see Bollen-Vanderboorn and Stevens (2012). 
77  A stance eliciting per se some bewilderment from the Commentators, see Ellison (2012). 
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Casteels the pension benefits that stemmed from the company’s supplementary pension, the time 
during which he had been working in Germany. This was on the basis that the period of 
employment in Germany (slightly less than 3 years) was short of the vesting period.78 For this 
period, Mr. Casteels would only be able to claim the reimbursement of his own contributions. The 
Labour Court of Brussels, which had to decide on the action brought by Mr. Casteels, stayed the 
proceedings and asked whether the decision of British Airways (and the underlying collective 
agreement upon which the employer’s decision was based) was compatible with Articles 39 and 
42 EC (now Articles 45 and 48 TFEU). 
 
The Court of Justice did not consider the issue from the point of view of Article 48 TFEU, finding 
that this Article could not be given direct effect because of its lack of precision as to the extent of 
the content of the protection.79 Instead, it analysed the case exclusively from the point of view of 
the free movement of workers (Article 45 TFEU). 
 
The Court hence assessed the application of the vesting period provided by the German collective 
agreement through its standard approach of restriction/justification.  
 
The measure was found to be a restriction to the free movement of workers. This was on the basis 
of the case law covering non-discriminatory restrictions.80 The existence of such a restriction was 
also confirmed by the ‘financial losses’ as well as by the ‘adverse effect on [the mobile workers’] 
supplementary pension rights’ stemming from the application of the vesting period.81 The Court 
then went on to look for a justification for such a restriction. In this process, the objective of 
retaining staff loyalty put forward by British Airways was discarded, as Mr. Casteels had in fact 
been employed by the same employer after exercising his right to free movement.82 The decision 
of the Court was thus that the years of service completed in Germany by Mr. Casteels had to be 
included in calculating the benefits of his supplementary pension.83 
                                                 
78  Casteels, paras 6-10. 
79  Casteels, paras 14-18. 
80  ‘Article 45 TFEU militates against any measure which, even though applicable without discrimination  
grounds of nationality, is capable of hindering or rendering less attractive the exercise by European Union 
nationals of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty’, ibidem, para 22 and cited case law. 
81  Ibidem, para 29. 
82  Ibidem, para 32. 
83  Ibidem, para 36. 
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The obvious question stemming from this decision deals with its applicability beyond the 
specificities of Mr. Casteels’ situation.84. This is particularly relevant for two different set  of 
reasons. The first one is rather evident: Directive 2014/50 is relatively recent and not retroactive, 
hence leaving all past claims to be resolved on the basis of the provisions of free movement of 
workers. Second, as we saw above, the same Directive does not cover several areas of potential 
litigation (transferability and cross-border membership, for instance) and leaves in place other 
possible obstacles to free movement (such as waiting and vesting periods of up to 3 years). 
 
The applicability to a broader set of situations stems from several elements of the decision. In the 
first place, the fact that the Court reached its verdict on the basis of primary law, so that a contested 
measure just needed to be liable to hinder free move ent of workers (even in a non-discriminatory 
way) to be scrutinised. Moreover, the measure whose application sparked the Casteels case is a 
rather common one, namely a vesting period. Such measur s are in fact still allowed85 under the 
new Directive. It is also worth stressing that, in the context of first pillar pensions, the Court has 
considered that the simple loss of part of an individual’s pension rights can hinder the free 
movement of workers.86 Thus, once the breach (hence, the restriction) has been identified, its 
justification might prove relatively complicated. This is because the Court of Justice consistently 
refuses justifications based on economic arguments.87 Hence, justifications based on the costs of 
allowing (for instance) aggregation of periods and/or transfer of contributions would not be 
accepted by the Court of Justice. 
 
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind the elements which militate in favour of a narrow 
reading of Casteels. 
 
The first important element comes straight from the wording of the decision. The CJEU explicitly 
refers to ‘the years of service completed by a worker for the same employer in establishments of 
                                                 
84  Baugniet, note 33 above: 307 and ff. has thoroughly analysed several hypothetical scenarios in his doctoral 
dissertation. 
85  See the summary of Directive 2014/50 above. 
86  Court of Justice, C-187/15, 13 July 2016, Joachim Pöpperl v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:550, para. 41. 
87  For example, see Erny, para. 48. 
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that employer situated in different Member States’88  (emphasis added). This very specific 
circumstance has further implications. On the one hand, it dictates the choice of the comparator 
for the analysis of the Court. Indeed, the situation of Mr. Casteels is compared with that of another 
British Airways worker who had not exercised his or he  right to free movement,89 and not, as the 
employer argued, with a worker of British Airways who changed employer while remaining in 
Germany.90 Furthermore, the continued relationship with the same employer also doomed to 
failure the justification put forward by British Airways based on the objective of ensuring staff 
loyalty.91 Finally, in Casteels the Court of Justice considered the consent provided by Mr. Casteels 
to its transfer to another establishment of the same employer located in another Member State as 
falling outside the definition of voluntary departure.92 It seems likely that moving to a different 
Member State in order to take up work for a different mployer would instead fall into such a 
definition. 
 
A second caveat comes from the role of the Graf exception.93 In the Graf case the Court established 
a so-called de minimis test,94 by ruling that an event might be ‘too uncertain and i direct a 
possibility […] to be capable of being regarded as li ble to hinder freedom of movement for 
workers’.95 As Barnard puts it: ‘non-discriminatory measures which do not substantially hinder 
access to the market fall outside Article 45 TFEU’.96 This was brought up by British Airways in 
Casteels in order to shield the application of the vesting period from the effects of the free 
movement of workers. Though the A.G. devoted a few paragraphs to answering (negatively) this 
exception.97 the Court decided not to mention it in its decision. It is interesting to consider the 
interaction of such an exception with Directive 2014/50. The new legislation could in fact play a 
role in convincing the Court98 that periods of employment falling short of the maximum ‘vesting 
                                                 
88  Casteels, para 36. This point has also been highlighted by Bollen-vanderboorn and Stevens, note 76 above: 77. 
89  Casteels, para. 23. 
90  See the Opinion of A.G. Kokott in Casteels, paras 47-51. 
91  Casteels, para. 32.  
92  Ibidem, para. 35. 
93  C-190/98, Graf, 27 January 2000. 
94  See Syrpis (2007: 110). 
95  Graf, para. 25. 
96  Barnard, note 12 above: 224). 
97  Opinion of A.G. Kokott in Casteels, paras 57-60. 
98  Thanks also to the persuasive power of its democratic imprimatur, as highlighted by Kilpatrick (2012: 7). 
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plus waiting’ period allowed by the said Directive could indeed be presumed as ‘too uncertain and 
indirect’ under Graf. 
 
3.3 The concentration road to portability? 
It has been argued that Directive 2014/50 does not offer much added value with respect to the case 
law of the CJEU, and specifically with respect to theCasteels decision.99 This should be nuanced 
in light of the multiple roles that legislative intervention can play even while codifying the already 
existing case law100 in terms of providing structure, detail, certainty, adaptation and consolidation. 
That said, it remains rather striking to notice that the protection granted by Casteels to mobile 
workers goes, to some extent, beyond that of Directiv  2014/50, as analysed above. 
 
Apart from the issues addressed in the previous Section, it is worth highlighting a second question 
arising from this situation. In doing so we leave aside for a moment the applicability of Casteels 
in a broader set of situations in order to focus on the wording of the decision.  
 
On this basis one might argue that, in order to enjy the right to free movement to its full extent, a 
worker should work for a multinational company. Indee , going much beyond the minimum rights 
protected by the Directive (which was not applicable ratione temporis) Mr. Casteels was de facto 
able to aggregate employment periods spent in different Member States in the context of the 
pension scheme organised by his employer.101 Such a solution is actually closer to the much more 
developed coordination system for statutory pensions than to the one established by the Directive 
on supplementary pension rights. 
 
This conclusion is not particularly striking if one considers the longstanding ‘alliance’ between 
EU integration and multinational companies. These have often played the role of private actors in 
the decentralised enforcement of EU law, and hence in its judicial construction.102 
 
                                                 
99  Ellison, note 77 above: 327 points out that ‘more int restingly, from a legal viewpoint, the decisions seem to 
make almost redundant the need for a European Directive on cross-border vesting drafts for which have be n 
circulating the Commission and Parliament for several years’. 
100  See Kilpatrick, note 98 above: 6-7. 
101  Baugniet, note 33 above: 306. 
102  See Scharpf (2010: 221), Kelemen (2011: 27-28). 
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This ‘concentration road to portability’ can also be spotted in the attempts at creating an additional 
regime for pan-European pension providers.103 Such a possibility was explored in the public 
consultation launched by EIOPA,104 and received a mixed reaction.105 However, the approach 
remains alive. This can be testified by the creation of the RESAVER instrument, a pan-European 
fund addressed to a highly mobile workforce (namely, academic researchers).106  
 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
A Directive establishing minimum requirements ‒ as opposed to one providing for portability ‒ 
seems to represent the most advanced compromise posible at European level at this time. Also, 
the ambition of the EU to act in the field of occupational pensions on the basis of a ‘social’ rationale 
seems very limited. However, the consequences of workers’ mobility on occupational pensions 
are very real. Both the Directive, lack of ambition notwithstanding, and the case law of the Court 
of Justice are proof of this situation. 
 
In conclusion, we wish to highlight three main points that are worth keeping in mind when looking 
at the future of the EU legal framework for occupational pensions. 
 
First of all, observers and stakeholders should keep an eye on the discrepancies (and hence, the 
potential conflict) between Directive 2014/50 and the case law of the Court of Justice, embodied 
in the Casteels decision. On the one hand, the new piece of legislation might have a dampening 
effect on the application of free movement provision  in the field of occupational pensions. 
Essentially, the Directive would become the yardstick upon which to measure the compatibility 
with the Treaties. This kind of dynamic already exists in the field of occupational pensions, with 
legislative intervention to exclude non-statutory scheme from the coordination regime set up for 
social security,107 an approach promptly upheld by the Court.  
                                                 
103  So-called ‘29th’ or ‘2nd regime’; see EIOPA, Final Report on Public Consultation No. CP-15/006 on the 
creation of a standardised Pan-European Personal Pension product (PEPP), April 2016. 
104  European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, see https://eiopa.europa.eu/about-eiopa . 
105  See Investment and Pensions Europe, EIOPA finalises vision on pan-European personal pensio s, 3 February 
2016, available at: https://www.ipe.com/pensions/pensions/eiopa-finalises-vision-on-pan-european-personal-
pensions/10011758.fullarticle . 
106  On the RESAVER instrument,  see Degoli (2018), in th s Issue. 
107  See supra Section 2 and note n° 33. 
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On the other hand, the CJEU might still be called to ecide on one of the areas left outside the 
scope of Directive 2014/50, such as waiting/vesting periods of less than three years or a request 
for the cross-border transfer of the value of vested rights. A Barber-like moment,108 with the CJEU 
delivering a ground-breaking decision on one of these aspects on the basis of the free movement 
of workers might rekindle the ambitions of the European legislator. This mutually reinforcing loop 
between negative and positive integration would confirm a recurring characteristic of the evolution 
of EU integration.109 Moreover, the exclusion of retroactivity for Directive 2014/50 (another 
necessary compromise on the way to its adoption) will leave the door open for further litigation to 
be decided exclusively on the basis of primary law provisions for many years to come. Hence, the 
case law of the CJEU on topic here at stake might yet feed on this exclusion, with potentially far 
reaching economic implications for both workers andpension providers. 
 
Our second point stems from the first scenario sketched above, that is, from the scenario where 
Directive 2014/50 effectively represents the framework for the issue at stake. The decision in 
Casteels would thus be interpreted as a narrow exception to this regime, on the basis, we argue, of 
the identity of the employer. Such a scenario would provide an incentive for highly mobile workers 
to be employed by multinational companies, in order to enjoy the full extent of mobility in the 
field of their occupational pensions. This could be coupled with the creation of pan-European 
schemes, allowing mobility for workers moving between different employers (established in 
different Member States) affiliated to the same scheme. Such an ‘integration through 
concentration’ would hence sidestep the difficulties of finding a compromise at EU level that were 
painfully highlighted by the history of Directive 2014/50. Apart from the uncertainty of such a 
dynamic, made apparent by some answers to the EIOPA consultation mentioned above,110 this 
would entail another pernicious effect in the form of job lock. An employee enjoying (close to) 
full portability thanks to the fact of being employed by the same multinational employer or of 
being employed by employers contributing to the same pan-European scheme would find it 
extremely costly to move away from such a situation. 
                                                 
108  See the case C-262/88, 17 May 1990, Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:209. 
109  See Majone (2005: 156-157.)  
110  See supra Section 3.3. 
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The present configuration of the legislation ‒ and this is our final point ‒ also (implicitly) proposes 
a rather specific ‘profile’ of a mobile worker. In particular, the Directive seems more likely to offer 
useful instruments to safeguard pension rights of ‘engaged members’, i.e. highly-mobile and 
highly-skilled workers, as we highlighted while dealing with the provision of information in 
Section 2.2. In this sense, it is remarkable that just a year after the adoption of the Directive, EIOPA 
has identified the automatic delivery of information as ‘good practice’ on individual transfers,111 
whereas the Directive only requires provision of information on request of the leaving member. 
All in all, though the Directive represents a step forward in terms of minimum harmonisation in 
the field of occupational pensions,112 its role in promoting workers’ mobility in the EU will 
probably be very limited.  
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